



## In This Volume

Volume: 11

August 2024




### **The Politics of Belief: A Study of Radical Religious Presuppositions of Talibanism**



**M. Hossein Nouri**

PhD in International Relations (IR),  
specialising in Islam and IR, from South  
Asian University, New Delhi



## Contact Us

 @AISS\_Afg  @aiss\_afg  /AISSAfghanistan

 [contact@aionline.org](mailto:contact@aionline.org)  [www.aionline.org](http://www.aionline.org)

## Summary

This piece explores extremism from a religious perspective, challenging the prevailing view on the potential for the Taliban to engage in peaceful coexistence while focusing on “The Islamic Emirate and Its System” (2022) by ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī. It elaborates on the constructed presuppositions developed in this work that can shape the lifeworld and behaviour of actors in socio-political relations.

It argues that the misconception of the Taliban’s transformation stems from misunderstanding the presuppositions in their political conceptualisation. It suggests that behavioural change could occur by transforming these essentially subjective and deeply ingrained pre-understandings, which underlie the Taliban’s refusal to engage in cooperative relations. This piece thus draws correlations between texts with normative forces and actions with tangible elements, expounding the radicals’ incapability to moderate behaviour towards other national, regional, and global entities.

## Abstract

This piece explores extremism from a religious perspective, challenging the prevailing view on the potential for the Taliban to engage in peaceful coexistence while focusing on “The Islamic Emirate and Its System” (2022) by ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī. It elaborates on the constructed presuppositions developed in this work that can shape the lifeworld and behaviour of actors in socio-political relations. It argues that the misconception of the Taliban’s transformation stems from misunderstanding the presuppositions in their political conceptualisation. It suggests that behavioural change could occur by transforming these essentially subjective and deeply ingrained pre-understandings, which underlie the Taliban’s refusal to engage in cooperative relations. This piece thus draws correlations between texts with normative forces and actions with tangible elements, expounding the radicals’ incapability to moderate behaviour towards other national, regional, and global entities.

**Keywords:** Talibanism; pre-understandings; lifeworld; Islamic comprehensiveness; Islamic domination; perpetual war.

Mehr Brief

## Contents

Abstract.....	1
The Politics of Belief: A Study of Radical Religious Presuppositions of Talibanism .....	1
Static Pre-Understandings .....	3
Final Thoughts.....	7
Another.....	9

مهر

Mehr Brief

## The Politics of Belief: A Study of Radical Religious Presuppositions of Talibanism

Looking beyond alternative origins, the Taliban, whether viewed as an agency-constructed phenomenon or a religious structural anomaly, is a complex entity. It inherently diversifies and is influenced by national, regional, and global crises that stem from intricate power dynamics.<sup>1</sup> By deliberately setting aside its diverse origins, this piece will meticulously illuminate Talibanism from a religious perspective. This careful approach aims to challenge the prevailing views on the potential for negotiation and peaceful coexistence with this group, with a particular focus on *The Islamic Emirate and Its System* (2022), authored in Arabic by ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī.<sup>2</sup> This analysis selectively elaborates on the religious presuppositions, pre-understandings, or prejudices (used interchangeably as foundational principles or mindset) embedded in this work; these fundamental elements shape actors’ consciousness, influencing rational decisions and radical behaviour for their interests.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, this endeavour draws correlations between the radical-religious components in these presuppositions and the actors’ conduct. While refuting the idea of transforming Islamic extremists, the argument posits that the misconception of change stems from a misunderstanding of the presuppositions inherent in the specific political conceptualisation that defines radical understanding and consequently influences political behaviour. Nonetheless, this pervasive misunderstanding ingrained in diverse cultural contexts, in spatio-temporal positions, and agents’ attempts can immorally justify the reprehensible behaviour of actors. The Islamic presuppositions expounded in this work hold no significance for those minds that deliberately downplay the violence depicted in this text; however, this piece will highlight these instances, examining what some critics call the extremists’ manifesto to address the misunderstanding. It argues that behavioural change could occur by transforming prejudices and pre-understandings, although such transformation is difficult to quantify due to the subjective nature of religious rigidity. In other words, radicals who aggressively pursue their goals are unlikely to reconsider the profoundly ingrained assumptions based on long-standing religious knowledge and experiences. Radical pre-understandings are internalised ideas and opinions deeply rooted in sacred knowledge and experiences; they profoundly shape consciousness and advocate values that normalise specific socio-political practices.

Understanding behaviour requires analysing a specific text (a linguistic expression reflecting individuals’ mentality and elucidating their intentions)<sup>4</sup> alongside its numerous interpretations.<sup>5</sup> This multifaceted approach helps capture the intricacies of socio-political practices reflecting the textual elements. To shed light on these complexities, we select a text that wields socio-political influence over

minds and hearts, propagating a language of fear rooted in religious presuppositions and radical exerting normative force, evident in the antagonistic relations aiming to fulfil interests and meet expectations. The sayable presuppositions outlined in the text, *The Islamic Emirate and Its System* (2022), have seeable consequences in the socio-political policies of Islamic extremists.

The presuppositions retrieved from Islamic tradition and reconstructed in this book dictate specific behaviour for Islamic radicals. Intellectually developed within language, these pre-understandings shape the lifeworld and expectations, enabling us to interpret the actions of individuals.<sup>6</sup> Integrated with the concept of lifeworld, which encapsulates the historical environment inhabited by beings such as humans,<sup>7</sup> they can profoundly shape one's understanding or misunderstanding of national and international politics. Although rooted in emotional and intellectual realms, they have significant socio-political consequences, constructing Islamic interactions with national, regional, and global actors. They serve as pivotal components of interpretation and understanding,<sup>8</sup> fundamentally stemming from the tradition we are engaged in.<sup>9</sup> With their religious and cultural dimensions, they significantly delineate extremists' perceptions, profoundly impacting their future paths and leading to a violent way of life in socio-political interactions. This piece thus examines presuppositions, highlighting their normative influence on radical wills, mindsets, and behaviour, as well as their potential for misunderstandings.

The prejudices underlie the Taliban's refusal to engage in cooperative relations and peaceful coexistence at national, regional, and global levels. Their denial involves examining the elements shaping their lifeworld and expectations embedded in a religious-political culture that cultivates instances of pre-understandings, say, Islamic comprehensiveness, the perception of being divine agents on earth, male dominance, the distinction between friends and foes, the propagation of Islamic ideology through eternal *jihād*, and the pursuit of Islamic hegemony (which will be further explored).<sup>10</sup> As guiding principles in their relations, these socially and politically constructed ideas underscore how extremism shapes the Taliban's national, regional, and global policies, staunchly resisting any behavioural modifications and political adaptations. Serving as theoretical and practical foundations, these deeply affect the lived experiences of each actor and portray a radical understanding of tradition, symbolising others as enemies (who can be anyone) subjected to violent eradication. Substantially, the implied meanings of these examples of pre-understandings, visible in socio-political transactions, generate religious expectations. This is why the Taliban, as well as ISIS and al-Qaeda, actively pursue their interests and implement aggressive policies.

## Static Pre-Understandings

The concept of Islamic comprehensiveness views Islam as a religion that encompasses every aspect of existence, guiding individuals towards ultimate happiness in this life and the hereafter.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, for extremists, Islam is seen as an all-encompassing system that condemns all divergent human opinions and beliefs as manifestations of *jāhiliyya*. This pre-understanding dictates the implementation of practical rules and regulations that, according to extremists' viewpoint, must be universally enforced by a political-military entity, extending into spheres of worship (*ibādāt*) and social transactions (*mu'āmalāt*). The evident normative force of this concept rigidly validates Islamic comprehensive political, legal, social, and economic systems. It effectively unites various radical militant groups that do not acknowledge or follow modern universal values and norms, blurring the moral distinction between good and evil. A radical, distinctive understanding of Islam fundamentally diverges from modern universal values and norms, shaping the lifeworld of adherents who actively advocate for the global implementation of *sharī'a* with its unyielding interpretation and broad scope.<sup>12</sup> It leads to misunderstandings, giving rise to irrational expectations and fostering distorted interpretations that fuel violent behaviour. In addition to other prejudices hindering constructive mutual dialogue, this preconception compels extremists to inaccurately interpret and misunderstand other actors, leading to aggressive efforts to enforce Islamic systems. It contradicts universal norms and values. More precisely, it emboldens religious militants in their pursuit of Islamic expansionism while opposing humanitarian worldviews that uphold universal ethics. These ideologically constructed militant groups thus strive to establish God's viceroy on earth, a religious concept rooted in Islamic tradition.<sup>13</sup>

As a radical pre-understanding, the belief in being God's representatives allows these extremists to feel entitled to assert absolute authority over the rights and freedoms of others. This belief justifies their violent propagation, promotion, and enforcement of Islamic ordinances, all while asserting their adherence to these laws and claiming to understand their true meanings.<sup>14</sup> It historically shapes consciousness, inspiring individuals to establish socio-political relations that grant them the authority to act on behalf of God without any moral accountability. For instance, the Taliban, akin to ISIS and al-Qaeda, perceive themselves as God's agents, governing and enforcing divine law on earth while aiming to eliminate all human systems. His viceroys embody a political ideology that compels them to export their radical movement as a divine mandate across borders and to fight other regional actors as adversaries in their quest for power.

As a distinctive concept thoroughly examined by Ḥaqqānī, a male dominance idea can profoundly impact the mindset of individuals striving for a comprehensive

Islamic system. Prioritising men underestimates women's capabilities and emboldens radicals to intervene in all aspects of their lives and exert control over their bodies, as vehemently advocated by Islamic fundamentalists.<sup>15</sup> This pre-understanding leads extremists to deduce that women should not hold authority over men because they are perceived as a harmful source of misery and disaster, capable of destroying a nation—a belief purportedly derived from a *ḥadīth* attributed to the Prophet, as argued by radicals.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, it portrays women as unsuitable actors to govern Muslims and manage their affairs, considering them inherently deficient in both intellect (*ʿaql*) and faith (*dīn*), as derived from another *ḥadīth* cited by al-Ḥaqqānī.<sup>17</sup> His radical interpretation of tradition necessarily embodies the prejudice that men, as custodians, are intellectually and religiously superior to women, and it serves to deprive women of their rights and freedoms while justifying male dominance over women through the constructed Islamic ordinances. This preconception leads al-Ḥaqqānī and, generally, the Taliban to view women as sexual objects and adamantly assert that women are not entitled to participate in socio-political activities alongside men.<sup>18</sup> In brief, according to him, the prohibition of women from attending mosques, markets, schools, and offices, as well as working and participating in politics stems from men's perceived superiority over women in terms of creation, power, ability, reason, and religion, as asserted by these extremists.<sup>19</sup> Developed within political discourse aimed at constructing meanings based on patriarchal interests and desires, this mindset could significantly shape masculine perspectives and worldviews, ultimately serving to subjugate women. Religiously and ideologically indoctrinated fundamentalists employ this political tactic to justify the confinement and control of women's bodies, branding them as sources of sedition (*fitnah*).

Above all, the radical comprehensive interpretation of Islam distinguishes the non-Islamic system as *jāhiliyya*, highlighting the traditional historical clashes of values. This distinct prejudice indicates that all contemporary laws and procedures are deemed satanic, leading humanity towards destruction and corruption.<sup>20</sup> The constructed dichotomy between friends and foes reinforces an authoritarian Islamic system. Traditionally, an emir wielding absolute power and the highest political and religious authority establishes general policies for governance.<sup>21</sup> This perception unconditionally opposes modern systems, labelling them as *jāhiliyya* that could be democratic systems with their techniques of power transition through democratic means.<sup>22</sup> This dichotomy rejects political participation, devaluing human rights and freedoms as manifestations of *jāhiliyya* while opposing pluralistic, secular values. It promotes a political understanding in which democratic equality, often perceived as corruption, is inherently seen as deviating from Islamic teachings and divine methods.<sup>23</sup> This distinction is a significant prejudice, notably characterising human laws and systems as immoral symbols of non-believers and oppressors.<sup>24</sup> It also advocates for an authoritarian perspective,

denying individuals' right to freedom of expression and prohibiting the expression of any view or belief as harmful innovation (*bid'ā*); this stance is yet based on a radical interpretation of Islam and *sharī'a*.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, all modern norms, values, and principles are recognised as corruption, and the Taliban are actively striving for their eradication.

Denying domination (*nafy sabīl*) signifies Islamic independence and prohibits external control over Muslims' social, cultural, political, economic, and military spheres. Derived from the *Qur'ānic* verse, "God will never grant the disbelievers a way to prevail over the believers,"<sup>26</sup> this assumption emboldens Islamic actors to pursue power, establish a formidable militia, and acquire weaponry to intimidate enemies, who may encompass any individual, group, or entity, and to dismantle their dominance.<sup>27</sup> Acquiring power is pursued to combat enemies, eradicate disbelief, and forcefully establish God's religion,<sup>28</sup> and it is deemed mandatory to defend Islamic systems and territories. However, for al-Ḥaqqānī, like other extremists, the denying others' domination or *nafy sabīl* signifies perpetual *jihād*.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, it entails an offensive emancipatory mission to liberate Muslims from oppression,<sup>30</sup> which is another extremist preconception. This internalised presupposition implies a radical Islamic strategy of expansionism, overlooking friendship with other actors who are perpetually viewed as enemies.<sup>31</sup> It dictates the Taliban's perception of rivals as enemies and encourages them to take violent actions, especially when modern values, norms, and rules are seen as looming threats to their radical identity.

The preconception of Islamic hegemony involves perpetual *jihād*, seen as an obligatory duty for Islamic actors to combat rivals, eradicate human values and norms as sedition (*fitnah*), and propagate radicalism as an act of divine worship. It compels radicals to establish an Islamic political system and revive divine law, *sharī'a*.<sup>32</sup> Along with persistently preserving national hegemony, understanding *jihād* as an everlasting war, and firmly believing to be on God's path and His servant,<sup>33</sup> the Taliban, as a radical group, would inevitably be motivated to export extremism to neighbouring countries and beyond by supporting their militant counterparts. Essentially, while believing that they are the instruments of divine will, they would spread extremism by maintaining national hegemony and interpreting *jihād* as perpetual warfare. This preconceived notion, based on the premise of perpetual hostility and warfare, realistically accentuates the militias' propensity for aggressive policies and advocates the regional dissemination of a radical ideology beyond national borders.

Islamic assumptions can politically conceptualise eternal *jihād* for domination (*istilā*), a radical policy principle that exclusively promotes violent means in national and international domains. A comprehensive understanding of Islam also includes



the Islamic hegemony pursued by extremists, who believe that seizing power through forceful domination can lead to legitimate Islamic rulership under an Islamic emir.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, these socio-politically constructed prejudices ultimately serve the overarching goal of establishing hegemony. The deeply internalised presupposition of Islamic *istilā* essentially invites extremists to propagate their radical ideology through political, military, and strategic support of other militant factions amid regional and global security crises. This also legitimises their violent campaigns, which have been historically and politically cultivated within Islamic tradition.<sup>35</sup> Theoretically rooted in the intellectual history of political jurisprudence, the technique of domination is perceived as a means to islamise modernity and reislamise Muslims through expansionism. However, it rejects modern universal values and norms under a rigid interpretation of *sharī'a*, which serves as a supreme religious, political, and legal structure. The all-encompassing Islamic system, founded on a radical, absolute belief, thus embraces the preconception of expanding power and domination by backing regional militant allies in combatting *jāhiliyya*, per its interpretation in the Qutbian doctrine.

These ideologically indoctrinated extremists, the Taliban, are persistent in their commitment to uphold these presuppositions with unwavering significance and unchanging meaning. In their effort to reinforce these biases, they prioritise religious education to indoctrinate rigid minds, demonising modern knowledge as inherently corrupt knowledge and forbidding attendance at schools to prevent moral corruption or religious deviation, as believed by al-Ḥaqqānī.<sup>36</sup> Despite being rooted in Islamic comprehensiveness, these pre-understandings compel them to outlaw modern schools and knowledge, which they perceive as profound ignorance and a primary source of corruption.<sup>37</sup> To preserve a radical interpretation of religion and disseminate its constructed meanings, they find these perceptions necessary to suppress non-conformists and heretics and to enforce their indoctrinated educational system.<sup>38</sup> Establishing social, political, cultural, and economic systems involves preserving fundamental presuppositions, as outlined in *The Islamic Emirate and Its System* (2022), which are articulated statements with tangible outcomes evident in the Taliban's national and international actions. These assumptions aim to steer individuals towards more aggressive and terror-related objectives.

## Final Thoughts

With the preconceptions that drive war, violence, and aggression, Talibanism fundamentally opposes change, negotiation, and peaceful coexistence. In contrast to the rigid inflexibility of these presuppositions, transformations require viewing others through a different lens, necessitating openness when actors encounter new experiences.<sup>39</sup> These pre-understandings, theoretically and significantly, oppose the idea of openness, which recognises that participants in a dialogue must be willing to accept certain things that go against their wills and interests.<sup>40</sup> Subsequently, denying dialogue organised in a question-and-answer format to resolve disagreements mutually<sup>41</sup> implies a refusal to acknowledge others as equal partners with the same rights and freedoms. However, the Islamic radicals who internalised these pre-understandings acknowledge them as eternal divine ordinances. These ordinances are yet considered fixed and religiously unquestionable, prohibiting openness between parties and opposing equality among participants. Disciplined within religious inflexibility, they cannot establish common ground and promote dialogue that nurtures a shared language of mutual understanding through a dialectic of questioning and answering.<sup>42</sup> Thus, the lack of openness hinders dialogue and fosters misunderstanding, impeding negotiation, agreement, and coexistence. These presuppositions, the crucial prerequisites that make understanding possible,<sup>43</sup> also constitute the perceptions of relations and an exclusive right and authority to present a specific radical interpretation of Islam. They allow the extremists to maintain an inflexible and strict interpretation of Islam, granting them absolute authority, which frequently leads to violence. They make them believe that the only correct understanding of Islam is through their fixed perspective, disregarding other viewpoints. These underlying preconceptions contribute to perpetuating a stagnant narrative of Islam through violence against citizens by constructing radicals' lifeworld and expectations. They thus indicate that Islamic extremists, who are politically and ideologically constructed, are incapable of evolving into moderate political entities that can cooperate or coexist peacefully with other national, regional, and global parties.

Essentially, since understanding involves cognition and acceptance, Islamic radicals would never acknowledge anyone or any entity as legitimate rivals with whom they could establish friendly relations and collaborate on social transactions.<sup>44</sup> More importantly, these prejudices, shaped by religious ordinances aimed at controlling behaviour, compel them to oppose universal norms and values, leading them to deny diversity and misjudge potential dialogue with other actors. Misrepresenting dialogue illustrates that the Taliban lacks the mutual understanding necessary for peaceful coexistence with rivals. They challenge the traditional, historical, and linguistic preconceptions that facilitate negotiation and encourage cooperation. They, therefore, lack the opportunity for constructive

engagement. Islamic extremists share religious knowledge and experiences that shape their behaviour, viewing their rivals as enemies with whom negotiation and agreement are impossible.<sup>45</sup> Relying on preconceptions, expectations, and vested interests,<sup>46</sup> they adhere to whatever aligns with their static assumptions, which are rooted in the Islamic texts constructing their consciousness, as well as any spatio-temporal associations they have in society. The pre-understandings thus carry normative forces that construct radical behaviour with socio-political and religious consequences. Put differently, these articulated perceptions result in tangible consequences that impact the trajectory of each extremist individually. They propagate terrorist activities nationwide and beyond by influencing their minds and hearts. They inspire conflicts against perceived enemies identified by radical traditions, forming Islamic policies that outline aggressive regional and global objectives. They are understood as immutable religious principles that serve as divine ordinances to clash with humanitarian universal ethics, values, and norms. However, originating from a linguistic essence, these pre-understandings inevitably serve to unify all religiously indoctrinated militant groups, including the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qaeda, that collaborate towards establishing hegemony in Afghanistan and spilling over surrounding nations. Through their discursive linguistic formation, these presuppositions oppose peace while promoting perpetual war within the country and beyond. They emphasise the tendency of language as a socio-political force that obliterates any prospect for revision and reform. They have historically masked the realist interests and expectations, warranting further examination.

## Another



M. Hossein Nouri holds a PhD in International Relations (IR), specialising in Islam and IR, from South Asian University, New Delhi. He is currently engaging in a project exploring Michel Foucault's ideas in relation to Islamic jurisprudence and women's rights and freedoms in Afghanistan, aiming to contribute to the discourse on gender, religion and politics.



Mehr Brief

---

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> What are power dynamics and how they could lead to these crises is an independent question that requires another attempt.
- <sup>2</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022). The book strives to legitimise radicals’ rule over people by force as a manifesto, retrieving the Islamic political jurisprudence initially developed by al-Māwardī (972–1058) and ibn Farra (990–1066).
- <sup>3</sup> These presuppositions demonstrate the policy principles in national and international domains, which can lead to the extreme radicalisation of Islamic political behaviour.
- <sup>4</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 438.
- <sup>5</sup> More importantly, prejudices affect interpretation based on presuppositions. See Maria Nyström and Karin Dahlberg, “Pre-understanding and Openness—a Relationship without Hope?” *Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences* 15, no. 4 (2001): 340. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1471-6712.2001.00043.x>
- <sup>6</sup> Mats Alvesson and Jörgen Sandberg, “Pre-understanding: An Interpretation-Enhancer and Horizon-Expander in Research,” *Organization Studies* 43, no. 3 (2022): 397. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840621994507>. Still, the interpretation itself occurs in the medium of a language. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 390.
- <sup>7</sup> Lifeworld, where historical creatures like us live, is a historical concept. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 239.
- <sup>8</sup> Moḥammad Mojtahed Shabestarī, *Hermeneutics, the Quran and the Sunnah (the Process of the Interpretation of Revelation) [Hermeneutics, Kitāb va Sunnat]* (Tehran: Terh-e Now, 2002), 17.
- <sup>9</sup> Maria Nyström and Karin Dahlberg, “Pre-understanding and Openness—a Relationship without Hope?” *Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences* 15, no. 4 (2001): 341. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1471-6712.2001.00043.x>
- <sup>10</sup> The ethnic origin of the Taliban and the instrumentalisation of these notions require further endeavour.
- <sup>11</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 5, 23.
- <sup>12</sup> For the Taliban, *sharī‘a* is a comprehensive and eternal divine law that governs all aspects of life. See ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 22, 24.
- <sup>13</sup> A *Qur’ānic* verse mentions that God informed the angels that He would appoint His ruler on earth. See *Qur’ān*, 2: 30.
- <sup>14</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 161.
- <sup>15</sup> Bobby Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1997), 8.
- <sup>16</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 80, 276.
- <sup>17</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 81, 82.

- <sup>18</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 148–149.
- <sup>19</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 151–152, 239. According to him, men obeying women is considered a sin that leads to the downfall and humiliation of men. See ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 260–262.
- <sup>20</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 300–301.
- <sup>21</sup>. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 102.
- <sup>22</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 155, 61, 137.
- <sup>23</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 75. Al-Ḥaqqānī insists that democratic equality among humans, such as men and women, wise and ignorant, Muslims and non-Muslims, and pious and non-pious individuals, corrupts Islam. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 75.
- <sup>24</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 27.
- <sup>25</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 43. In this respect, for him, democracy as a *jāhīlī* system is the source of conflict, disagreement, and differences that are forbidden in Islam. See ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 74.
- <sup>26</sup>. *Qur’ān*, 4: 141.
- <sup>27</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 31.
- <sup>28</sup>. *Qur’ān*, 8: 39.
- <sup>29</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 121–122.
- <sup>30</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 31.
- <sup>31</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 80.
- <sup>32</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 18.
- <sup>33</sup>. Muḥammad Ḥassan Kākar, *Journey to the Homeland: Taliban and Islamic Fundamentalism [Safarī ba Waṭan: Taliban va Bunyādgrāye-i Islāmī]* (Kabul: Shirkat Kitāb Shah Muḥammad 2011), 255.
- <sup>34</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 175–176.
- <sup>35</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 66. Ironically, the proponents of domination invite citizens to accept the absolute, violent rule of political actors who control people’s lives and property. See ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 70–71.

- 
- <sup>36</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 242–243.
- <sup>37</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 244. While enforcing the prohibition of girls attending schools, they have consistently established new *jihādīst madrasas* and repurposed various educational institutions, including schools at all levels, universities, and even museums, into hideouts for terrorism.
- <sup>38</sup>. ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Ḥaqqānī, *Al-Emirat al-Islāmīya wa Niẓāmuḥā [The Islamic Emirate and Its System]* (Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Shar‘īya, 2022), 116.
- <sup>39</sup>. Maria Nyström and Karin Dahlberg, “Pre-understanding and Openness—a Relationship without Hope?” *Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences* 15, no. 4 (2001): 341.  
<https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1471-6712.2001.00043.x>
- <sup>40</sup>. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 355.
- <sup>41</sup>. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 360. Dialogue, where mutual understanding occurs, differentiates pre-understanding from rigid ideas, biases, and blinders. See Mats Alvesson and Jörgen Sandberg, “Pre-understanding: An Interpretation-Enhancer and Horizon-Expander in Research,” *Organization Studies* 43, no. 3 (2022): 398.
- <sup>42</sup>. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 371. Understanding “pervades all human relations to the world.” See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), xx.
- <sup>43</sup>. István M. Fehér, “Prejudice and Pre-understanding” in *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics*, ed. by Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell 2016), 280.
- <sup>44</sup>. Moḥammad Mojtahed Shabestarī, *Hermeneutics, the Quran and the Sunnah (the Process of the Interpretation of Revelation) [Hermeneutics, Kitāb va Sunnat]* (Tehran: Terh-e Now, 2002), 13.
- <sup>45</sup>. Islamic actors such as the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qaeda have similar features and are influenced by similar Islamic pre-understandings and prejudices.
- <sup>46</sup>. Moḥammad Mojtahed Shabestarī, *Hermeneutics, the Quran and the Sunnah (the Process of the Interpretation of Revelation) [Hermeneutics, Kitāb va Sunnat]* (Tehran: Terh-e Now, 2002), 8.