By Mohammad Noman Baber 

In recent years, Afghanistan's political landscape has seen the emergence of figures advocating for a shift toward federalism. They argue that a federal system is crucial for ensuring social justice and political stability, as it would prevent the concentration of power within a single institution. This discourse gains attention as many former politicians and activists, now sidelined from political power, advocate fervently for federalism as the sole solution to Afghanistan's longstanding political instability and challenges over the past two centuries. Looking at the structure of a federal system, it may seem like an effective and suitable political model for Afghanistan's diverse ethnic landscape. Federalism has proven successful in countries with similar ethnic complexities, and Afghanistan's multiethnic society might benefit from such a system, where a decentralized government manages federal affairs. At the same time, autonomous provinces handle local matters, potentially offering stability. However, critical questions arise: How compatible is this political model with Afghanistan's traditional and political society? To what extent can it address Afghanistan's political instability? Moreover, an important consideration is whether Afghan society is prepared to embrace such a significant change in the country's political structure.

Transitioning to a federalized political system is a formidable journey, often spanning years or even decades. It requires a concerted effort to align the collective understanding of the public, fostering a political culture that can sustainably adapt to new institutions. While many countries have successfully embraced federalism, the case of Afghanistan presents unique challenges rooted deeply in its traditional society. Unlike Western nations, where federal systems have flourished, Afghanistan's societal fabric is steeped in tradition and historical complexities. Here, the concept of political culture diverges significantly from that of Western democracies. It encompasses not just the political elite of urban centers but the entirety of Afghan society, each segment contributing its perspectives and values to the broader political discourse.

Taking a pragmatic view of the situation, it becomes evident that several critical prerequisites must be met for a successful transition. Foremost among these is establishing strong, transparent, and accountable political institutions, alongside a foundation of check and balance within institutions, counter-corruption policies, and most notably, the trust between the people and the government. Sadly, these factors are notably lacking within Afghanistan's current political landscape. Over the past two decades, the Republic of Afghanistan's government has struggled to counter corruption within its institutions. Not only have governmental efforts to eliminate corruption fallen short, but corruption itself has played a significant role in the republic's downfall. Given these challenges, it becomes increasingly apparent that Afghanistan may not yet be ready for the profound changes that federalization would entail. Rather than fostering political stability, such a transition could inadvertently worsen existing issues, fueling corruption, exacerbating ethnic tensions, and raising local powers.

Considering the discussion on local powers in Afghanistan's modern history, the history of Afghanistan reveals a pattern where political leaders have often viewed power as a prize to be claimed rather than a means of serving the people. Instead of prioritizing societal welfare, they have sought to expand and solidify their power bases. A notable illustration would be Afghanistan's modern political history, which foreign interventions have marked. Following the overthrow of Daoud Khan's government and the rise of the People's Democratic Party, Afghanistan became a battleground for global powers, notably the Soviet Union's intervention. Afghan Islamist groups, supported by intelligence agencies from neighboring countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, fought against the Soviet forces. After nearly a decade, the Soviet Union withdrew, leaving Afghanistan in a sensitive state of political crisis. 

Subsequently, the communist government was overthrown by the Mujahideen. However, the leaders of the seven Islamic parties, each with their loyal followers and power bases, engaged in internal power struggles, viewing political power as a prize to be claimed rather than serving the nation's interests. In a short period, they emerged as dominant figures within their respective regions, challenging the government's authority. This proliferation of power centers ultimately led to the emergence of warmongers across the country, fueling political instability and eventually igniting a devastating civil war. From this turbulent period, one crucial lesson emerges: Dividing power in Afghanistan, given its history of instability, risks further destabilization and the emergence of competing power centers that undermine the government's autonomy. Such fragmentation could pave the way for regional separatism or another destructive civil war.
Furthermore, this fragmented political landscape could facilitate interference from external intelligence and non-state actors, with neighboring countries competing for regional influence. 

It is widely acknowledged that neighboring countries have consistently interfered in Afghanistan's political affairs to advance their strategic interests. Pakistan and Iran, for instance, have a history of involvement in Afghanistan's politics to achieve their own regional and trans-regional objectives. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has often been a victim of these regional and international rivalries, with major powers like Russia, the USA, and China also playing significant roles. Given Afghanistan's predominantly illiterate population, it could become a vulnerable space for regional and international intelligence agencies to carry out destructive activities for their strategic objectives. The high level of illiteracy in Afghan society makes it easier for regional intelligence services to manipulate and sow divisions within ethnic groups, perpetuating the political disorder. This intensified regional competition has the potential to deepen internal crisis and hinder efforts to establish a cohesive and stable political order.

The root of Afghanistan's current crisis over the past two decades lies in the excessive centralization of power within one political institution, primarily vested in the executive branch. This centralization has crippled the country's internal politics by marginalizing other government entities and concentrating power in the hands of one individual and institution, as exemplified by the governance of Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, who faced accusations of power centralization from his opponents. A decentralized unitary system is essential to navigating Afghanistan and overcoming this dilemma. Such a system would devolve administrative power to local authorities while maintaining oversight by the central government. This approach ensures that power is not concentrated in a single entity and facilitates checks and balances among institutions, preventing government fragmentation and fostering political stability. Cooperation from regional countries, the global community, particularly the United States, and international actors like the United Nations is essential to establish such a system. This cooperation is crucial to support Afghanistan's growth, strengthen its institutions, and ensure regional stability.

Mohammad Noman Baber is currently pursuing a degree in Political Science at York University in Toronto, Ontario.  He has been an executive committee member of the Association of Private Schools in Afghanistan. His experiences reflect a blend of academic pursuit, advocacy, and a commitment to sharing insights on crucial issues.

Academicians and Officials interested to publish their academic pieces on this page, please approach us through: opinions@aissonline.org

The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.