By Elham Kabir

The conflict in Afghanistan, spanning two decades from 2001 to 2021, was the longest war in US history. It was also NATO's longest deployment, and the UN's longest peacekeeping mission. The "War on Terror" in Afghanistan resulted in an estimated cost of $2.313 trillion.

However, the UN describes the situation in Afghanistan as the world's fastest-growing humanitarian catastrophe, with more than 90% of households lacking access to sufficient food. Only 38 cents of every dollar spent on aid in Afghanistan actually reached the local economy, according to the World Bank. Additionally, waste, fraud, and corruption affected approximately 30% of US expenditure on Afghanistan from 2009 to 2019.

The war economy in Afghanistan saw a significant portion of aid flowing to Afghan warlords, with a 2010 US Senate study revealing that most of the $2 billion industry was used as security money for these warlords, as well as, billions and trillions of Dollars to mega contractors and corporations.

Analysis and Discussions

A study by the Congressional Research Service found that in 2019, the average cost of an American soldier deployed to Afghanistan was almost $2.1 million per year. This covers wages, benefits, education, and additional costs like travel, gear, and supplies.

If we analyze the economic boost that the soldiers have brought to Afghanistan, we may estimate that, on average, the cost of one soldier is roughly $1.55 million a year, which equates to $195 billion in revenue for both parties (the international community and Afghanistan) from 2010-2012.

Afghanistan had tremendous potential to exploit this for its own economic and political stability, but that did not happen. The "war economy" reversed the course of events.

U.S. and partners strategic failure

The U.S. and allies committed a few errors in Afghanistan throughout the span of its contribution to the country from 2001 to 2021. A portion of the key mix-ups include:

Focusing in a lot on military tasks: The US put a heavy emphasis on military tasks in- Afghanistan rather than on reconstruction, humanitarian, economic and development programs, which ended up being costly and unreasonable over the long haul.

Overlooking corruption and the legitimate democratic administration; In spite of spending billions of dollars on aid to Afghanistan, the US did not satisfactorily resolve the issue of democratic elections. There were accusations of fraud and corruption both during the Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani era.

Underestimating the Taliban; The US miscalculated the Taliban's strength and viability, which had the capacity to refocus and continue fighting despite extended periods of military activity and the deaths of important pioneers.

Absence of coordination and methodology; The US did not have a sound procedure or facilitated way to deal with tending to the complex political, monetary, and social issues in Afghanistan. This absence of coordination and technique brought about divided and insufficient endeavors.

Lack of understanding of the local culture and environment; The US struggled to grasp the complex social and political aspects of Afghanistan, which hampered efforts to establish strong ties with local networks and address the root causes of instability.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Strategic Failure

There were a few factors that contributed to the breakdown of the Afghan government in 2021:

First, the Afghan government was unprepared for the U.S. exit because it did not realize that the United States was genuinely departing. Leaders of the Afghan government believed that the United States was not serious about leaving, as there is a history of American wavering on the topic of withdrawal, each of which resulted in the United States remaining in Afghanistan.
Second, the Afghan government was kept out of the U.S.-Taliban negotiations. The Afghan government was made weaker and more vulnerable because of this. The Taliban therefore gained more confidence to pursue a military triumph.

Third, although being in a state of helplessness, the Afghan government insisted that the Taliban should be included within the Republic, in order to gain headway in harmonious exchanges.
Fourth, The Afghan security forces and administration were rife with corruption, which reduced both their efficacy and credibility. Many public servants prioritized their own financial well-being over the needs of the populace, which damaged trust in the government. The US provided over 75 percent of the total of the Afghan government's budget in the form of foreign assistance, which made up a significant portion of its expenditure.

The War Economy in Afghanistan: Beneficiaries and Ramifications for Political Stability

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) deals for operations in Afghanistan amounted to roughly $108 billion over the course of the country's 20-year intervention (2001–2021). This comes on top of the many trillions of dollars spent on DoD contracts that have been carried out in the United States throughout that time. Approximately $108 billion was invested in 14 major corporations who got over one billion dollars in total contract spending in Afghanistan, with the biggest corporation obtaining over $13.5 billion. Almost 40% of this money went to these businesses.

Thousands of smaller contracts were also awarded, and more than one-third of the spending on contracts went to "undisclosed" recipients—domestic and international companies that cannot be uniquely identified- in the databases of contracts that are available to the public, on the US spending website, or the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). Only five big weapons contractors have received between 25 and 30 percent of all Pentagon deals.

In the fiscal years (FY) 2019 and 2020, these five corporations were awarded roughly $286 billion in contracts, as well as, $2.1 trillion in Pentagon contracts from the FY 2001 to FY 2020 (in Dollars exchange price of 2021). To put these numbers into perspective, the $75 billion in Pentagon purchases that Lockheed Martin received in FY 2020 is more than 1.5 times the combined budget for the State Department and Agency for International Development for the same calendar year, which was $44 billion.

Conclusion

The war economy in Afghanistan has not only benefited warlords, criminal networks, and the Taliban but has also provided significant opportunities for contractors and corporations. The involvement of these actors in the war economy has perpetuated corruption and diverted resources away from the Afghan government and its people.

Addressing the influence of contractors and corporations, along with warlords and criminal networks, is crucial in combating corruption and promoting sustainable economic growth. By ensuring transparency, accountability, and equitable distribution of resources, the negative impact of these actors can be mitigated, fostering a more stable and inclusive economy in Afghanistan.

Elham Kabir has a master’s degree in international relations. He has extensive professional experience of over 10 years, both in governmental and non-governmental entities, and in executive positions in Afghanistan.

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.