By Neelapu Shanti

During his state visit to India on 4–5 December 2025 for the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that “in every country there are problems, and Afghanistan is not an exception. But the Taliban clearly controls the situation… you have to accept it because it’s reality.” This statement signals a pragmatic acceptance of Taliban rule, but it raises a fundamental question: have India and Russia—both of which earlier dismissed the “good Taliban–bad Taliban” distinction as simplistic—now recalibrated their positions, and if so, on what grounds?

Have India and Russia abandoned their earlier stance of empowering the Afghan women through education and employment? What has happened India and Russia’s demand for an inclusive Government in Afghanistan which would have paved the way for a peaceful and stable government in the country? Has Taliban severed ties with its long-standing terrorist affiliates such as Al-Qaida, ETIM, IMU, Jundullah, or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)? And is there any credible assurance that the Taliban will refrain from exporting jihad beyond Afghanistan’s borders?

Moscow’s decision to accept Taliban-appointed diplomats raises further concerns. Does this signify trust in the Taliban’s commitment to combating ISIS-K, particularly to prevent attacks against Russian interests? Russia owes the international community a clear and transparent threat assessment of both the Taliban and ISIS-K. Such clarity is essential, as Russia’s posture inevitably influences smaller states, which may follow its lead without fully grasping the long-term consequences. Misjudgments and ad hoc policies risk dragging vulnerable countries into a trajectory that could culminate in widespread instability.

At present, the approach to “normalising” Taliban-a terror faction under UN sanction terrorist list appears fundamentally flawed. Legitimacy must precede engagement. Interaction with any group claiming to rule Afghanistan—including the Taliban—without first establishing political legitimacy only entrenches disorder. As long as this approach persists, Afghanistan will remain an arena for great-power manoeuvring, while regional security deteriorates and the Afghan people continue to shed blood and bear the cost.

Russia’s Evolving Engagement with the Taliban

Afghanistan’s strategic geography has once again become a pawn, placing the country at the centre of renewed ‘Great Power Game’ involving the United States, China, and Russia, with Pakistan precariously balancing its alignments. The Soviet invasion of 1979 and the humiliating withdrawal in 1989 remain critical historical markers, having contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Despite its current conciliatory rhetoric, Russia’s posture toward the Taliban prior to 2021 was already ambivalent. In 2018, U.S. General John Nicholson publicly alleged that Russia had provided covert arms and intelligence support to the Taliban in its fight against ISIS-K and NATO forces. Following the abrupt U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Moscow intensified its engagement with the Taliban, culminating in the group’s delisting as a terrorist organisation in April 2025, an upgrade in diplomatic status in June, and full recognition in July—the first such recognition globally. This trajectory was reinforced by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Kabul in November to discuss security cooperation.

The question is how could Russia decide on removing Taliban leaders from the UN’s sanctions list on their own? Is that not the prerogative of the Afghan people and a legitimate government? These are the very elements that have been provided safe havens in Pakistan and have been responsible for the killing of thousands of innocent Afghan people and have still not given up violence.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Russia’s “flexible approach” and its willingness to remove select individuals from sanctions lists amount to a de facto legitimisation of a violent non-state actor. Such actions undermine the normative framework of international counterterrorism and risk integrating terrorist groups into governance structures under the guise of pragmatism. While Russia formally banned the Taliban in 2003, analysts rightly observe that delisting at the national level is largely symbolic as long as UN sanctions remain binding.

As per 2017 reports (Independent News UK and Zeit) Russians are reported to be recruiting mercenaries to fight abroad. Earlier reports also suggest Russia supplied Taliban in Afghanistan during US fighting Taliban before 2021. There are reports of Moscow encouraged Tajik Intelligence to facilitate shipment of Russian Arms to Taliban.

Reports suggests Russia has been employing Private Military Companies (PMCs), known as ‘Chastnye Voennie Companiy’ (ChVK). These PMCs, founded by Dmitry Utkin, nicknamed Wagner, have become Moscow’s tool for Russian military operations and related political activities abroad- an attempt to project influence with plausible deniability—an approach shaped by Moscow’s bitter experience in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Yet Russia’s strategic objectives remain opaque. Is this engagement intended to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal? If yes, this is not a meaningful support to bring peace in Afghanistan.

In July 2024, President Putin described the Taliban as “allies in the fight against terrorism,” specifically against ISIS-K. Such assertions warrant scepticism. If armed non-state actors are normalised as counterterrorism partners, international institutions may eventually be compelled to accept governments born of violence. This would set a damaging precedent, weakening global counterterrorism efforts and placing smaller states at a strategic disadvantage. The question is what role does Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) play to counter terrorism?

The critical question remains whether Russia and India have unequivocally conveyed that recognition hinges on political legitimacy achieved through an inclusive and representative process. Recognition without legitimacy would erode the international legal order and embolden violent movements elsewhere.

Russia–India Discussions on Afghanistan

Against this backdrop, India and Russia recently discussed Afghanistan in New Delhi, reaffirming their commitment to countering terrorism, including cross-border movement, terror financing, and safe havens.

Both sides emphasised coordination through security council-level dialogue and the Moscow Format, which was originally conceived to promote inclusive inter-Afghan dialogue.

No diplomatic format can succeed without a legitimate Afghan government.

This stands in stark contrast to current realities. While President Putin has credited the Taliban with reducing opium production and combating terrorism, reports from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union Drugs Agency suggest a more complex picture, marked by persistent cultivation, illicit trade, and the rise of synthetic opioids.

As per Journalist Bilal Sarwary, on Twitter X on May 4, 2025, stated that “Despite public claims of a crackdown on narcotics, recent developments suggest that the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts are selective, inconsistent, and potentially politically motivated”.

He highlighted on key issues that contradicts Taliban’s claim on drug eradication efforts. “Taliban-Linked Poppy Cultivation in Dai Kundi and Badghis Verified reports indicate that individuals affiliated with the Taliban have leased large tracts of agricultural land in provinces such as Dai Kundi and Badghis. These lands have been used extensively for poppy cultivation, despite the group’s stated prohibition on narcotics”.

Although the Taliban publicly assert a commitment to eliminating narcotics, current evidence reveals a selective and inconsistent approach, shaped by political considerations and reinforced by tolerated poppy cultivation, preferential impunity, and superficial enforcement at the district level.

The broader dysfunction of the UN Security Council compounds the problem. The veto power of the P5 countries (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) often serves narrow national interests rather than collective security, leaving global crises unresolved and encouraging the formation of competing alliances.

India’s Position on Afghanistan

The visits of Taliban ministers Amir Khan Muttaqi and Nooruddin Azizi to New Delhi in October and November 2025 occurred amid strained Taliban–Pakistan relations, driven by escalating TTP violence and persistent border tensions.

Among the Afghan people, India’s engagement with the Taliban is widely perceived as unrealistic and untenable—a moral indictment and a failure of humanity itself. The Afghan Republic Mission in New Delhi was compelled to shut down unethically by the Government of India in 2023 to accommodate the Taliban, a decision that further eroded trust among Afghans.

Addressing the United Nations Security Council on 10 December 2025, India’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Parvathaneni Harish, called for nuanced policy instruments that could deliver sustainable benefits to the Afghan people. This distinction is critical: India’s engagement must prioritise Afghan people and should not confer legitimacy upon the Taliban regime.

Yet, a fundamental question remains unanswered. Has India lived up to the vision of the Afghan people—and, more importantly, to the expectations and hopes that every child, including Afghan women and girls, would have access to their basic right to education over the past four years? The answer is no. Did India demonstrate the same resolve and determination to raise its voice for an inclusive government in Afghanistan? Again, the answer is no.

By design, India continues to view Afghanistan primarily through the lens of its proxy rivalry with Pakistan, rather than as a space requiring the rebuilding of trust, dignity, and sustained support for the Afghan people. In doing so, India has missed the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to addressing broader challenges that afflict humanity—poverty, hunger, disease, and inequality. The humanitarian aid assistance stills remains a short term measure and it would never make Afghan people self-reliant.

What could have been achieved through collaboration and solidarity has instead been undermined by the logic of employing one extremist faction to counter another. In spirit, if not in letter, India has weakened its moral standing at the United Nations and diluted its commitment to international law. Let us be unequivocal: equal rights and equal opportunities are not partisan concerns; they are global imperatives and the foundation of peace, prosperity, and progress.

Across these fronts, India has effectively lost Afghanistan by choosing engagement with the Taliban over principled advocacy for the Afghan people.

Over the past four years, India has repeatedly abstained from voting against the Taliban at the UN Security Council, even as countries such as Australia adopted a more principled stance. Earlier this month, Australia imposed financial sanctions and travel bans on four Taliban officials, citing the deteriorating human rights situation in Afghanistan, particularly the systematic repression of women and girls.

The Current Situation in Afghanistan

According to the UN Secretary-General’s June 2025 report, Afghans face deepening poverty, unemployment, reduced access to basic services, and increasingly repressive governance. The Security Council Monitoring Team confirms that Afghanistan remains a hub for global terrorism, with the Taliban continuing to provide safe haven to Al-Qaida, TTP, and other groups.

Since 2021, more than 21,000 jihadi madrasas have reportedly been established, compared to just 106 regular schools, underscoring the regime’s ideological priorities. The Durand Line issue needs to be solved through diplomatic talks and its continued tolerance of groups hostile to neighbouring states further destabilise the region.

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch in his latest article dated October 31, 2025 in Rakhsa Anirveda stated that “the Taliban and Pakistan have been calling for Ghazwa-e-Hind (GEH) in the past, saying Kandahar Se Le Ke Dilli Tak Islam Ka Parcham Lehraega. We must also acknowledge that in the present context, Al Qaeda and Taliban are in mutual support, plus ISIS/ISKP and many other terrorist organisations (particularly the Haqqani Network) are operating from Afghanistan”.

The absence of accountable, inclusive governance has created a profound security vacuum. Terrorism flourishes where legitimacy is absent and rights are denied. Effective counterterrorism demands a credible Afghan government that adheres to its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373, and 2615. Without such foundations, Russia, India and other stakeholders’ engagement with the Taliban risks perpetuating instability rather than resolving it.

Neelapu Shanti is a New Delhi Based international affairs research analyst, writer, journalist and Indo-Afghan analyst. MA in International Relations Post-Graduate in Journalism.

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.