By: Said M. Azam

The withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan and China’s progressive regional policy is yet another invitation for Turkmenistan’s gas to flow, eventually, to South Asia, and beyond, via the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. However, this may come at the expense of either India’s participation in the project or a painful fundamental geopolitical setback for her and provided China does get involved, the road will be paved for TAPI to become TAPCHI.

Background

The United States and the Taliban movement signed a peace accord earlier this year in Doha-Qatar, according to which the United States, along with other NATO members, will withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by the summer of 2021. In recent weeks, reports have emerged of China reaching an agreement with Iran which will result in China investing hundreds of billions of dollars in various sectors in Iran, including the development of energy resources and further enhancement of the Chabahar seaport.

For almost 2 decades, India had hoped they would develop the Chabahar port which would connect them to markets in land-locked Afghanistan and other Central Asian republics. India saw the project as a strategic investment which in return would allow them to bypass the territory of its arch rival, Pakistan. For decades, Pakistan has managed to block any Indian goods to reach the aforementioned markets. India, the entire region, as well as the rest of the world is well aware of the potential significance of the Chabahar Port and TAPI for the Indian economy and geopolitical interests. China knows this too and has effectively managed to exclude India from Chabahar and will presumably replace India in the TAPI gas pipeline project.

Though not publicly admitted, China’s interest in developing the Chabahar port might have created concerns for their closest ally, Pakistan, which considers the port to be a rival for its own seaport, Gwadar, which is just about 100 miles away from the Iranian port. If India was developing Chabahar, Pakistan could appreciate the fact. However, now, the most important, or according to some analysis, the only ally of Pakistan, China, is investing in this project.

With the implementation of the peace accord between the Taliban and the United States, it is strongly predicted that the Islamic movement would play the central role in conducting government affairs in Afghanistan. Pakistan is believed to be the main supporter of the Taliban and China has, historically, maintained a working relationship with the Islamic movement. India, on the other hand, considers the movement its adversaries.

Iran has never hidden its desire to transit the natural gas from Turkmenistan through its own territory to Europe or other international markets. It opposes the building of Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) which will potentially connect gas fields from Turkmenistan to European markets via the Caspian Sea. TCGP is strongly supported by the European Commission (EC), the United States (US) and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkmenistan sees the implementation of TAPI and TCGP to be strategically important to them because they will reduce Turkmenistan’s reliance on China, currently, the only foreign market for Turkmenistan’s natural gas.

Turkmenistan, historically, has negative experiences from being dependent on a single market. Its alleged mistreatment by Russia which used to be the sole importer of its natural gas, at the time, caused Turkmenistan to strike a deal with China in 2006. The deal facilitated construction of multiple gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to China, since then.  Export of gas from Turkmenistan to Iran, however, halted in December 2016.

Pakistan is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of the larger One Belt and One Road initiative that passes through the disputed territory of Kashmir; to which both Pakistan and India have territorial claims.

Discussion and Conclusion

The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan will provide an opportunity for other countries like China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran to dominate and dictate future developments in the entire region. One potential area that all these stakeholders will keenly want to influence will be the energy sector. The region is blessed with abundant energy reserves and is also home to nearly three billion people. The fact that in countries where major hydrocarbon reserves are located are also far less populated in comparison to those countries where there are markets for energy products, makes the whole region highly fertile for economic exchanges.

While Mother Nature has placed this region in an exceptional advantageous position, myriads of problems including the brutal history of colonization at the hands of European powers, intrinsic hostility between India and Pakistan and prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan, as well as the geopolitical and security architecture and structure in the region, to name a few, has not supported and has, rather, weakened the materialization of major economic exchanges.  Since it was first announced, a quarter of a century ago, TAPI, the first major energy project to transmit natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India, has remained victim to the aforementioned problems and has not yet been completed. The future of TAPI will still, inevitably, be dictated more by geopolitical consideration rather than by purely socioeconomic variables.

With the return of the Taliban to the centre of politics and withdrawal of US-NATO forces, India which has had cordial relationship with post-Taliban administrations in Afghanistan, will lose, to a great extent, its influence over shaping future developments in the entire region. India’s rival, China will fill the void created by the departure of NATO and also the retreat of India. Even before the US-Taliban peace deal, China had expressed its desires to join TAPI.

Involvement of China in TAPI will elevate chances for materialization of the project. Though Turkmenistan will still remain somehow dependent on China, it will still welcome the initiative as it will expand market for its vast natural gas resources. Afghanistan will be pleased to acquire the cheaper and also comparatively cleaner fossil energy for its domestic consumers and for receiving transit fees from the project.

Pakistan will positively view the implementation of this project for several reasons. First and foremost, the project will contribute to minimizing Pakistan’s severe need for additional energy products, including imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Second, it will bring its most important strategic ally as a stakeholder to the project, particularly when China replaces Pakistan’s arch rival, India. Either state owned or private enterprises from member countries might form a consortium to collectively export natural gas from Turkmenistan, most probably from Afghanistan and other Eurasian countries as well, in the form of LNG to Europe and other international markets. Therefore, Pakistan might turn from a net LNG importer into a net LNG exporter. A phenomenon that Indian experts have feared for quite a long time and the Gwadar seaport will still remain relevant and important despite China’s potential involvement in the rival Chahbahar seaport in Iran. Due to additional leverage of China over policy makers in Tehran as a result of the aforementioned potential massive Chinese investments in that country, Iran will refrain from opposing implementation of the project.

China offers addressing poverty in its close neighbourhood as the main rationale for design and implementation of the OBOR initiative. China believes that poverty causes the evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The evils that could cause expansion of conflicts and insecurity to its own territory. Within the same thought framework, China will justify its involvement in TAPCHI. If it does decide to expand the pipeline to mainland China, one of the potential routes could be to extend it via Kashmir, the parallel route to CPEC.

Other member states may still want India to remain in the project. Because that will further justify, economically, the implementation of TAPCHI. In that case the letter, I, in the acronym of TAPCHI will still represent India. However, India might prefer to walk out rather than to stay on. If China does decide to extend the pipeline along the parallel route to CPEC, the decision would place India in a difficult situation. India would face a tough choice to either compromise its territorial and geopolitical claims and interests for economic benefits or leave this strategically valuable project.

It is inconceivable but not impossible that in consensus with China’s grand vision for OBOR, China might decide to extend a forked pipeline that diverges from the original TAPI pipeline in Herat and then extend it via Central Afghanistan and the Wakhan Corridor to Xinjiang province in China. By doing so, China will assume the role of a leader in the project through cooperation with, rather than exclusion of, other stakeholders; a decision which would contribute to preservation of stability and peace in the entire region and China’s extended neighbourhood. The new design will serve as a prelude for diversification of transit routes for China’s potential imports of oil and gas via pipelines from Iran. Or else, China satisfies its own gas imports from Turkmenistan only through, already functioning, pipelines that are extended through Central Asian republics and becomes only a partner in the consortium for export of LNG via Gwadar seaport. Consequently, India will remain as a member in the project, though, they may prefer to not participate in the consortium for export of LNG via the Pakistani seaport(s).

Said Mohammad Azam is recipient of Fulbright Scholarship from the US State Department. Alumnus of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) and the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Former Afghanistan Correspondent of Agence France Press (AFP).

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.